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One of  the most important theoretical physicists of  the twentieth century, Erwin Schrödinger, considered “obvious” 
that there is only one human consciousness, and that the feeling of  having an individual mind is just that, a feeling 
(Schrödinger 1944). With all due respect for the father of  the wave equation of  quantum mechanics (for which he 
received the Nobel Prize in 1933), I will continue to assume we all have our own minds and our own self-
consciousness, but just only one. 
	 It is not difficult to imagine the Viennese genius turning in his grave if  he could read the paper “Two languages        
two minds” (Athanasopoulos et al. 2015), because if  the authors were right, an extra proliferation of  minds in people 
would be involved. Athanasopoulos et al. echo the famous statement by Charlemagne that speaking another language 
is like possessing another soul, and they update it implying that speaking two languages is like having two minds. The 
phrase is good as a headline (although not as suggestive as that of  Charlemagne), but it implies a rather drastic 
devaluation of  what we usually mean by mind and (I suspect) a somewhat simplistic view of  the relationship between 
language and cognition. 
	 The logic of  the experiments in which that conclusion is based is relatively simple. It is based on the interesting        
fact that monolingual German speakers are more likely to identify a video in which a person walks towards a car 
(without showing if  the person reaches the car) with a video in which someone enters a house, than with a video in 
which someone goes towards a distant building without reaching it. This would imply that, when in doubt, these 
speakers tend to focus more on the end of  the event (entering the house) than in the development of  it (walking 
towards the distant building) and, therefore, they more often categorize the incomplete car video as of  the first type. 
The reverse situation occurs with monolingual English speakers, which tend to identify the car video with the far 
building video (focusing on the unfinished development of  the event). According to the authors, this is because the 
progressive aspect is grammatically encoded in English, while it is not in German. According to their data, only 37% 
of  English speakers identified the event of  the car with the house event, compared to 62% of  Germans. It is an 
interesting phenomenon, no doubt about it, but it adds nothing to the already widespread and (in my opinion) 
unfounded claim that an “English” mind can be different from a “German” mind. 
	 Bilingual subjects are the tricky case. If  a German mind is different from an English mind (let us assume so for        
now), what is the mind of  a German-English bilingual speaker like? Or does he/she have two minds? By now it is clear 
that we no longer know well what the word mind designates, but let us continue. 
	 In a first experiment described in the article, German-English bilinguals tended to behave like monolinguals,        
though with less pronounced differences. So, when the experiment was done in a German context (because the 
subjects are given instructions in German and they have to respond in German), speakers tend more often to prefer 
the house video as more similar to the car video (and not the building video), whereas when the same subjects act in an 
English context, they tend to prefer the building video (which marks the event in progress, not completed) as more 
similar to the car video. Although the authors do not say it, this more moderate behavior of  bilinguals can be an effect 
of  the interference between languages, so that when they speak German they are less “German” than German 
monolinguals, and when they speak English they are less “English” than English monolinguals. 
	 The second experiment is more interesting, but much less statistically conclusive, and more cumbersome in        
design. In this experiment the “verbally mediated categorization” of  bilingual speakers is hindered by making them 
repeat aloud a sequence of  numbers while performing the same task of  the previous experiment. According to the 
authors, this interference task inhibits the language in which it is assumed that the subjects are thinking, and it makes 
them to choose the options that correspond to the other language. So, when bilinguals are doing the experiment in 
“German context” and their German language is interfered making them repeating numbers (in German!) while 
watching the videos, they are less likely to choose the house video (the one preferred by German speakers), and they 
are more likely to choose the far building video (the one preferred by English speakers). Halfway through the 
experiment a change is made, so that they have to say numbers in English (supposedly to disrupt access to this 
language) and then it turns out that they tend to choose more like “Germans”. The explanation offered by the authors 
is that when the task of  verbal distraction interrupts access to the language of  the context of  the experiment, the other 
language takes over, so to speak.
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	 This is not the place to assess the assumption that access to language (or, as the authors say, to “verbally mediated        
categorization”) can be interfered by the task of  verbally repeating numbers. But it is worth noting the apparent 
contradiction in assuming that the active language can be interrupted, and assuming at the same time that the other 
language, supposedly inactive, comes to supply the “disrupted” one, because then it is not clear that the verbally 
mediated categorization (whatever it may be) has been really interfered. Note that the same task of  distraction applied 
to monolinguals would imply that no language is used for the test (because they have no other language that may be a 
supply), which just shows that the influence of  a given language in categorization is modest, unless we assume that 
there is no categorization of  any kind. But this makes no sense, since in that case the monolingual subjects are not 
inactive, but continue identifying the videos (although using something that is not language, according to the logic of  
the authors). 
	 The paper claims to have shown that English-German bilingual speakers have a flexible categorization of  the        
world depending on which language is dominant in a particular task of  identifying motion events. Its conclusions are 
rather ambitious: “These findings show that language effects on cognition are context-bound and transient, revealing 
unprecedented levels of  malleability in human cognition.” 
	 But if  the effects of  the spoken languages on cognition are context dependent and transitory, I think that what this        
study shows is that the effects of  the specific language one is using on cognition are really weak or superficial, so that 
speaking of  an unprecedented malleability in human cognition is not appropriate. If  we accept that statement, then 
we should acknowledge that the term cognition is used in a different sense when used in the quoted text and when 
used to refer to human cognition in general (as compared, for example, to feline or avian cognition). Perhaps an 
underlying problem is that cognition is identified with categorization, but that is an overly complicated issue for this 
occasion. 
	 Anyway, the suggestion that bilinguals have two minds contrasts with research on bilingualism in recent years.        
Judith Kroll et al (2015) summarize this progress in a recent state of  the art which concludes: “Contrary to the view 
that bilingualism complicates the language system, this new research demonstrates that all of  the languages that are 
known and used become part of  the same language system”. 
	 Bilinguals (contrary to what was believed in the past) do not work as two monolinguals, but their languages        
interfere with each other and tend to coalesce into a single system of  knowledge. It has even been observed (see Kroll 
et al. for references) that the brain tissue employed in the storage and processing of  the two languages is essentially the 
same. Of  course, the bilingual brain is different from the monolingual brain, but not because the bilingual brain is split 
into two systems of  knowledge (let alone two minds), but because it develops a more complex system of  knowledge 
whose management increases certain abilities, just like lifting weights every day makes biceps grow. 
	 The most notorious finding in recent decades of  bilingualism research is that the two (or more) languages are        
always active and interfere with each other. It does not matter if  the L1 is very dominant on the L2, if  the two are very 
different in their morphology, phonology, syntax or even orthography, if  one is signed and the other oral, or even if  
only one of  them is used. The knowledge of  a second language continuously and incessantly affects the use of  the first 
language, and, of  course, the knowledge of  the first language (much more robustly) affects the use of  the second one. 
The possible cognitive benefits of  bilingualism derive from the extra need for the bilingual speaker to inhibit one of  
the languages when using the other, which provides an apparent improvement in the ability of  solving cognitive 
conflicts (both in the use of  language as elsewhere), and it even increases the protection against certain types of  
cognitive degeneration, including a delay of  symptoms of  Alzheimer’s disease. 
	 Actually, the fact that the two languages are always active and interfere with each other is expected because they        
are part of  a single system of  knowledge (language). This conclusion does not support the vision of  “two languages, 
two minds”, but, on the contrary, it shows that if  there is a part of  language that structures our mind and our 
consciousness (and it would be very strange if  it is not), that part coincides with what languages have in common. 
	 For the reader to be convinced of  how frivolous (in the use of  the word mind) may be the assertion that a bilingual        
has two minds, it is worth to consider an example of  the opposite: a person with one language and two different 
minds. Indeed, whether there are people who have two minds (that is, if  they are more than one person) has been 
seriously discussed, and I do not mean the cinematographic cases of  dissociative identity disorders, but cases of  people 
with a section of  the corpus callosum connecting the two hemispheres of  the brain. Perhaps the most famous case is 
P.S., a kid with split brain studied by Gazzaniga and collaborators (LeDoux, Wilson and Gazzaniga 1977).
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Although it is a controversial issue, the authors suggest that each of  the hemispheres of  P.S.’ brain was self-conscious 
and had its own mind. The interesting thing (in what affects us now) is that after the surgery, only the left hemisphere 
could talk, but both understood speech, and the right hemisphere began to communicate putting togetehr Scrabble 
letters to form words, using the left hand. It seems that P.S. had, unlike the patients examined so far, a substantial part 
of  language in the right hemisphere (even though he was not left-handed). The exciting fact is that the right 
hemisphere was shown to have feelings, to know what day was the day after, what profession he would like to exercise 
(different from that declared by the left hemisphere) and, in general, all the attributes of  a human mind. As LeDoux, 
Wilson and Gazzaniga noted, “each hemisphere in P.S. has a sense of  the self, and each possesses its own system for 
subjectively evaluating current events, planning for future events, setting response priorities, and generating personal 
responses.” 
	 The most important conclusion is that the fact that only in the case of  P.S. the cognitive independence of  the        
right hemisphere is detected, while the right hemispheres of  other patients do not reveal such capacity for self-
awareness (with the possible exception of  another patient named Vicki), suggests to the authors that “the presence of  a 
rich linguistic system is a reliable correlate, and perhaps a necessary prerequisite, to some of  the richer aspects of  
mental life.” 
	 It thus seems that the ancient intuition that language lies behind consciousness and the nature of  the human mind        
makes sense. But, contrary to the suggestion by Athanasopoulos et al., the ingredients that form the fabric of  our 
human mind are not the superficial, external aspects of  language that differentiate German from English (i.e. those 
aspects subject to historical change and, therefore, variation), but what is common to all languages, including, of  
course, the various languages in the (single) mind of  a bilingual. 
	 I am convinced that this idea would have seduced Schrödinger.        !
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